Secret Russian Document Reveals Moscow-Tehran Plan to Bolster Strategic Partnership Across Multiple Sectors

A non-public Russian government document has revealed Moscow's plans to deepen its relations with Iran beyond traditional trade, detailing the establishment of alternative financial channels, nuclear cooperation, Iranian production of Russian aircraft components, major energy projects, and new transport routes extending towards the Arabian Gulf. The document, titled "Cooperation Plan between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran for the Period 2024-2026," identifies the ministries, agencies, and state-owned companies responsible for these projects and sets deadlines extending until the end of 2026. In an analysis of the document, a research analyst at the Russia Program of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies indicated that the document's significance lies not in any single project, but in the comprehensive structure Moscow seeks to build around its relationship with Tehran. The analyst added that the roadmap is not entirely surprising, as many of the mentioned areas of cooperation between the two countries have been publicly known for years to close observers of the Russian-Iranian relationship. Experts suggest that Moscow and Tehran "desperately need each other," while Russia has expressed its support for the Iranian regime. The document predates the current conflict involving Iran and the United States by more than a year, meaning it does not specify which projects remain active or how the conflict has affected Moscow's plans. Nevertheless, an independent review of the Russian-language document, coupled with subsequent public reports, indicates that several initiatives outlined in the roadmap have progressed or been realized later. **Evasion of US Sanctions** According to a European intelligence source who reviewed the materials, these high-level, non-public documents illustrate extensive cooperation between Russia and Iran. The source added that the document is "strategic, sensitive, and highly political, focusing on areas such as nuclear programs, energy trade, and financial transactions aimed at evading US sanctions." In response, a US official, in an informal reply regarding financial provisions, stated that US sanctions have "severely isolated Russia and Iran from the international financial system," adding that the two countries' efforts to develop alternative financial channels and other schemes for sanctions evasion "are not surprising." The official emphasized that Washington closely monitors attempts by sanctioned jurisdictions to develop alternative cross-border payment mechanisms and will seek to disrupt those that facilitate sanctions evasion or illicit financing. The Russian document itself does not use the phrase "sanctions evasion." Instead, it repeatedly calls for increased use of national currencies, independent financial channels, and measures to counter what Moscow describes as "unilateral restrictive measures." **Building Financial Channels Outside Western Systems** Some of the clearest provisions relate to how Russia and Iran intend to transfer funds. The plan aimed to increase the share of bilateral trade conducted in national currencies from 68% in 2024 to 71% by 2026, while also seeking to expand correspondent accounts denominated in national currencies. More ambitiously, the roadmap calls for the Bank of Russia and the Central Bank of Iran to develop the use of central bank digital currencies in cross-border settlements. Another clause stipulates "ensuring the use of independent systems for financial messaging," including connecting financial institutions to independent channels for financial information exchange. The document does not specify which messaging system will be used or explicitly state that the goal is to circumvent SWIFT or US financial controls. Some of this financial integration has since become public. In February 2025, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk announced that Russia and Iran had "almost completely" shifted bilateral settlements to national currencies using their own systems for financial and banking messaging. Russia's Interfax news agency reported that this effort is part of a broader push towards independent payment infrastructure between the two countries. Iran's ambassador to Russia also stated in February 2025 that Tehran and Moscow no longer need the SWIFT system for bilateral banking relations and are using their own confidential banking messaging systems. He added that the first phase of connecting Iran's "Shetab" payment network to Russia's "Mir" system began the previous year. The analyst explained that the significance of these measures is cumulative, noting that "individually, none of these initiatives are transformative. But collectively, they constitute an attempt to eliminate individual vulnerabilities and build redundancy in the economic relationship between Russia and Iran." **Financial Efforts Coupled with Political Action** The roadmap calls for Russia and Iran to coordinate through the BRICS group and other international organizations against "unilateral trade restrictions," while another clause proposes studying ways to counter "unilateral restrictive measures" and their impact on global markets. The analyst indicated that the matter goes beyond merely finding alternative solutions, writing: "Particularly interesting is that the roadmap also goes beyond practical solutions for sanctions and includes an effort to build an intellectual and diplomatic campaign against sanctions themselves," citing plans for expert communities, discussion platforms, and an international forum focused on unilateral restrictions. In a related context, a US official stated that financial institutions and intermediaries facilitating sanctions evasion expose themselves to "significant sanctions risk," adding that Washington will continue to work with partners to "identify, expose, and disrupt these networks wherever they emerge." The official also rejected the idea that alternative Russian-Iranian systems could replace Western financial infrastructure, stating: "Russia and Iran can attempt to build alternative financial channels, but they cannot replicate the reach, liquidity, and international financial system's trust in the US dollar. Their efforts will not diminish the effectiveness of US sanctions." **Rosatom and Iran's Nuclear Sector** The financial structure is integrated with another strategically sensitive pillar of the relationship: civilian nuclear energy. The plan stipulates the continued responsibility of Russia's state nuclear corporation "Rosatom" in Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, including fuel support and maintenance for Unit 1 and the continuation of construction work related to Units 2 and 3. Cooperation was not limited to paper; on September 2, 2026, Rosatom announced that Russian specialists had begun returning to Bushehr, that Unit 1 was preparing for routine maintenance and partial fuel replacement, and that nuclear fuel had already been delivered to the site. Rosatom also confirmed the continuation of work at the plant, with more Russian specialists expected to arrive. The analyst pointed out that the Bushehr 2 and 3 projects predate the 2024 roadmap, meaning the document did not initiate this cooperation but integrated an existing strategic project into the broader framework between Russia and Iran. A European intelligence source stated that "these strategies and protocols confirm that Russia and Iran are closely allied nations, and Russia is almost certain to continue its current cooperation with Iran and seek to increase it through 2026." **Major Energy Projects** This agreement identifies the Shadegan, Kish, and North Pars regions and assigns responsibility for developing these projects to the Russian Ministry of Energy and unspecified "interested Russian companies." The names of these companies were not mentioned in the roadmap. For many projects, the funding box was marked "confidential." There is evidence that at least one of the mentioned projects has progressed. On February 13, 2026, Interfax reported that Russia's state-owned ZN-Vostok company was working on developing Iran's Shadegan oil field, while Iranian officials stated that Tehran hoped to expand Russian investments to include additional oil and gas projects. The roadmap sets key milestones for the Shadegan project until the end of 2025, while work related to the Kish and North Pars projects extends until 2026 and includes legal, commercial, and analytical project work. This pattern appears repeatedly throughout the document: ministries, deadlines, and strategic objectives are identified, while some participating companies or funding arrangements remain undisclosed. **Russian Aircraft Parts: "Made in Iran"** The roadmap calls for Russia to assist in establishing production in Iran for individual parts and assemblies for Russian aircraft. Russian authorities were directed to identify aircraft parts that could be repaired or manufactured in Iran, determine Iranian companies capable of producing them, approve selected sites through the Russian aviation regulator (Rosaviatsiya), and conclude a localization agreement. The roadmap set a deadline of March 31, 2026, for reaching an agreement on local production, and a target date of December 31, 2026, for launching prototype production. Public evidence suggests that aviation cooperation has advanced in aircraft maintenance. **Southern Trade Route** The document also outlines efforts to bolster the physical transportation network connecting Russia and Iran. It calls for work on a proposed railway line built to the Russian gauge of 1520 millimeters, extending from Iran's border with Azerbaijan towards Iranian ports on the Arabian Gulf. The proposal remained in the planning and negotiation stage within the roadmap. In a separate context, Moscow sought to develop the Rasht-Astara railway line, an approximately 162-kilometer missing link in the International North-South Transport Corridor. This project then moved beyond the purely conceptual stage. Russia's Ministry of Transport announced that Russia and Iran officially launched engineering studies for the railway in May 2025. The analyst explained that the project had not yet been completed by late summer 2026, as Russian and Iranian officials continue to work on implementation and construction arrangements. She also pointed to another clause: an Iranian investment in port infrastructure in Astrakhan, Russia. The roadmap includes the establishment of a terminal there with Iranian investment, along with warehouses, a logistics area, and facilities for storing grain and vegetable oils. The analyst found that an Iranian-owned company later operated a terminal in Astrakhan equipped with a railway spur, and was building facilities for storing grain and vegetable oils largely consistent with the roadmap's description, although the document does not explicitly name that company, and definitive confirmation of the match cannot be made. Collectively, the transport provisions indicate an effort to build physical trade routes less reliant on traditional European corridors.